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THE LESSONS OF LIBERALIZED
STANDING?*
Locus Standi - A Commentaiy on the Law of Standing in Canada.
By T.A. Cromwell. Toronto: Carswell, 1986.
REVIEWED By WILLIAM BOGART*
I.
Law reform is a funny business. Take standing, for instance.
The courts, for about a century, busied themselves encasing the
doctrine in a series of restrictive rules. They did this as they
wandered through various remedies in a number of substantive areas,
not linking one set of pronouncements with another. So, the rules
regarding public nuisance were transplanted to the soil of
constitutional law. The prerogative writs were enshrined in a
different set of strictures and, even there, supposed differences
emerged - cer-tioraii and prohibition allegedly were subject to more
liberal provisions. The requirements for injunctions and declarations
were said sometimes to be different and sometimes not.
One could spend copious amounts of time and energy parsing
curial pronouncements about when entitlement to sue was to be
bestowed. But the distillate centred around protection of an
individualism epitomized by protection of pecuniary or proprietary
rights and, conversely, an abhorrence of an undifferentiated "public"
ready to storm the courts and insist upon recognition of - what?
This question the courts did not answer, content to rest assured that
interests which could not be characterized in a conventional way
should not have a voice. The "public interest," after all, was
Copyright, 1989, W.A. Bogart.
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incarnated, they pronounced, in the Attorney General. He was to
decide where these concerns lay in any question and he could be
trusted to assert them, settle them or just leave them silent. His
hold was all but absolute.
But in the last decade or so the courts of at least the
common law world have announced that perhaps this whole business
has been overdone and the area could do with some fresh air. Most
prominent in this activity has been the Supreme Court of Canada.
It has reviewed the terrain four times in the past dozen years, and
each time it has loosened the grip of traditional interests so that
Canada, now, is perhaps the most liberal jurisdiction concerning
entitlement to sue. This is a funny business because we have been
thrust by the Supreme Court into the wilderness of a "genuine
interest" test for standing,1 and what does that mean? If our courts
know, they are not saying.
Such a substantial shift leads to the question of why we need
a law of standing at all. Maybe it is an encumbrance that, having
outlived its usefulness (whatever that may have been) should just
simply go away. Why not just proceed to the merits and dispense
with all the manoeuvrings that fights over standing inevitably cause,
with their attendant costs and delays for parties and judges? That
question ought to be answered, and equally important is how we go
about answering it, for doing so provides a window to examine
Canadian courts: what they do, and what they ought to do. Thomas
Cromwell offers his views about this question and how to answer it
in his Locus Standi - A Commentaiy on the Law of Standing in
Canada. An interesting little book, it mixes the approach of the
conventional doctrinal text with the author's explicit assessment of
what standing is and ought to be.
Before turning to Professor Cromwell's book, there are four
basic notions to be considered. First, courts exist to honour legality
and to resolve disputes, but, not always and everywhere. We create
courts and obey them because we need a device to resolve specific
and particular disagreements; and, as this is done, judges generate a
framework of norms, either under their own steam or by interpreting
1 Finlay v. Mi. of Finance (Can.), Min of Nat. Health and Welfare (CalL) andA.-G. Can.
(1987), 71 N.R. 338 [hereinafter Finlay].
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statutes and a constitution, that are guides to our conduct. But this
activity by courts, since it is triggered by specific issues, is a means
to an end, not an end in itself. We do not insist that all disputes
ought always and everywhere to be resolved by judges, or that there
are not, at times other means, as good as or better than courts, for
performing these tasks. The development of administrative law may
be the twentieth century's most prominent example of such an
alternative; of a realization that there are many ways sanctioned by
the state to resolve questions.
A second idea is that if an interest cannot be characterized
as pecuniary or proprietary it does not necessarily mean that the
interest cannot be valued; that an illegality involving it would be
viewed as something that ought not to engage the attention of
courts. It would be equally wrong, however, to shift to the position
that because many of these interests can lay claim to curial attention,
all of them should be allowed to do so; that it is either impossible,
or not worth the bother, to differentiate and value claims that before
were viewed as having no value at all. We need not loosen our grip
on established views of standing only to be forced to embrace the
idea that anyone should be able to sue anybody at any time for
anything.
The third idea, related to the second, is that although
differentiating and evaluating these non-traditional interests is no
easy process, it is not a quantum difference from that which
continues to concern traditional legal interests. Conventional
interests are constantly being moved off of and onto courts' agendas.
After all, it is not enough that a plaintiff can show that he or she
has had an interest invaded. A plaintiff must also show that the
interest is one the law will protect through a right to litigate. Ms.
Donoghue wasn't protected once,2 but she is now. Susan Nelles is
not protected, yet, against the pervasive claims to power of the
Attorney General,3 but someday (maybe soon) she might be.
Workers used to be able to sue their employers for injuries in the
workplace. Now, in most cases, they cannot. Some day victims of
2 Donoghue v. Stevenson, [1932] A.C. 562 (H.L.).
3 Nelles v. The Queen in Right of Ontario (1985), 51 O.R. (2d) 513 (C.A.) (at the time
of writing, this case is on appeal before the Supreme Court of Canada).
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motor vehicle accidents in Ontario may not be able to sue in court
but will seek redress in another forum. Why these various
traditional legal interests can and cannot sue depends on a myriad
of f ctors, some of which are peculiar to the context, and others
transcend specific considerations. Such assessments involve sensitive
social and political judgments and an awareness that, even when an
interest should be protected, the courts are not always the best
institution to perform that function.
The final notion is that there are no bright lines to
determine recognition of non-traditional legal interests. So, their
recognition or non-recognition is not dictated by the Attorney
General as guardian of the public interest, or by distinguishing
between "public" and "private" interests, or by particular concerns of
the administration of justice like justiciability, use of resources and
need for adversity. It is not that concepts of "public" and "private"
are irrelevant (these are discussed more fully below) but that fast
distinctions based on them are impossible to draw. There is nothing
mysterious about what the courts will be doing in determining
standing. Judges, and sometimes, legislatures will engage in a
determination of values, just as they do in other contexts in which
they are engaged. Indeed, one attraction of standing is that it lays
bare rather easily how value-driven judicial decisions are: "When a
court or the legal system does decide to recognize and hear a person
in a case, that decision may be taken (and criticized) as an
announcement that the values he is pursuing, the purposes of the
role he is assuming, have a public value."
II.
Locus Standi sets itself two tasks; indeed, this small book is
in some ways two. The one describes and analyzes standing in the
tradition of conventional legal texts. The other tackles some essential
questions surrounding standing, with the author's views and policy
formulations firmly delivered. In my view, there are some major
flaws in Locus Standi. Nevertheless, the book is a decided success
4 J. Vining, Legal Identity, The Coming of Age of Public Law (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1978) at 62.
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in offering both a road-map through the morass of cases and,
further, a developed view of what standing is and ought to be.
Cromwell describes and analyzes the law of standing by
investigating certain substantive areas and, then, how standing has
developed in various remedies. Even here, he does not plunge
ahead and suggest that he can tame the wilderness and weave all the
disparities together. He begins the enterprise with the right tone:
It may be doing the topic an unwarranted kindness to even speak of a law of
standing. The Canadian law on the subject consists of a number of rules developing
in a number of different doctrinal and remedial contexts, frequently with very little
attempt to reconcile outcomes with those obtained in parallel situations. To make
matters worse, the courts have not probed the rationalia of standing rules very
deeply. The result of all of this is a large body of case law that is difficult to
rationalize into a unified whole. 5
The four substantive areas which he examines are public
nuisance, shareholders' rights, municipal law, and constitutional and
related cases. He has selected these four areas because of the
continuity of development of standing that he observes therein.
Public nuisance is the primary source of the requirement that the
plaintiff suffer some special or peculiar damage. In developing this
requirement, case law established the domains of "public" and
"private" interests as the demarcation of recognition of entitlement
to sue and the role of the Attorney General, as guardian of such a
public interest, with the resulting strictures in standing law which
persisted until the Supreme Court's refacing.
The choice of constitutional law is equally obvious since this
area has been the main source of the refacing of standing in the
past dozen or so years,6 although, with the latest instalment, i.e.,
Finlay,7 the Supreme Court has now ventured explicitly into standing
in the context of judicial review of administrative action. A criticism
here: In the part on constitutional law there is a section on the
Charter of Rights and Freedoms that is thin. The section is very brief
T.A. Cromwell, Locus Standi - A Commentary on the Law of Standing in Canada
(Toronto: Carswell, 1986) at 11.
6 See Thorson v. A.-G. Can., [1975] 1 S.C.R. 138; N.S. Board of Censors v. McNeil, [1976]
2 S.C.R. 265; Min. of Justice (Can.) v. Borowski, [1981] 2 S.C.R. 575.
7 Supra, note 1.
1989)
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
and concentrates on hugging the few cases there are, instead of
using the unmarked terrain of the Charter as a vehicle for the
author's views of basic guideposts the courts ought to use and
whether standing under the Charter should be treated any differently
than in other areas of law. (Should violation of fundamental rights
and freedoms push towards even more liberal standing, or decidedly
less?)
Cromwell uses the sections on shareholders' rights and
municipal law to establish the basis the Supreme Court relied on in
breaking the mold in Thorson. I found the section on shareholders
quite interesting. Most discussions of standing have not looked to
the early shareholders cases as a source of the- law, but Locus Standi
establishes their relevance. More importantly, shareholders' rights
and, particularly, the interaction of personal, representative and
derivative suits and their uneasy development by courts and
legislatures, provide yet another example of how standing is not a
problem that arises only when a public entity - government or its
emanations - is sued. Most significantly, Professor Cromwell uses
these examples to show how procedure and substance are
intertwined and how, in addressing issues of standing we must
necessarily address how a particular area of law should develop and
which interests should be protected: "[T]he real issues concern what
rights ought to be legally protected and how those rights should be
defined."8
I make a special point of this not only because I agree that
this is a central element in any analysis regarding standing, but
because Professor Cromwell seems to turn away from this position
later in the book when he offers his own analysis. He appears to
reintroduce distinctions, particularly between cause of action and
standing, which obscure this vital aspect.
Locus Standi is strong in its treatment of standing in relation
to remedies, taking us through certiorari, prohibition, mandamus,
declarations, injunctions and statutory schemes for obtaining judicial
review of administrative action. Distinctions are thoroughly analyzed,
with particular attention to the impact that the trilogy of standing
decisions of the Supreme Court, existing at the time of the writing
8 Supra, note 5 at 34.
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of the book, might have on the various remedies. If anything,
however, the careful attention that is paid to the case law here
leads, at times, to an over-refinement that, while useful as a
compendium for the doctrinal analysis that courts and lawyers might
be tempted to engage in, is hair-splitting even on those terms. For
example, Professor Cromwell carefully sets forth the distinctions
between the rules regarding declarations and injunctions, yet
concludes: "[T]he two have been treated in the same way in a large
number of cases and there is no case law articulating the
differences."9
It is in the last two chapters, "Standing Rules and Their
Rationalia - A Critical Examination" and "Reforming the Law of
Standing," that the book develops its own views of what standing is
all about. Freed from close doctrinal analysis, this part is more
interesting, and I believe it will make the larger contribution.
Dragons need slaying in this area, and the book does good
service regarding a number of them.10 For example, Professor
Cromwell is particularly pointed in dismantling the claim of
Attorneys General to a monopoly in representing the public interest.
The book draws distinctions between the English Attorneys General
and the Canadian ones - such as, the Canadians' membership in
cabinet and active involvement in politics - that weaken claims of
Canadian Attorneys General to be the guardian of the public
interest. But even the English Attorneys General are open to attack
because of the potential for abuse of their exclusive discretion
concerning the public interest, a subject that clearly admits of no
indivisible and monolithic interpretation. Finally, in Canada, where
the courts have been empowered to patrol the limits of power
between the federal and provincial governments and, more recently,
to draw limits on that power itself, it is "incongruous ... to assume
that the unreviewable discretion of the Attorney General is needed
to prevent them [the courts] from acting in appropriate cases."'11
9 bid at 157.
10 For instance, his criticism of the public-private distinction, ibid at 148-54, 177-80.
Professor Cromwell also provides insightful reviews of other approaches to reform of standing,
ibid. at 203-07.
11 ibid. at 188.
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Cromwell concludes, rightly, that breaking the politician's monopoly
need not lead to ousting him or her altogether. The Attorney
General can still both commence and intervene in litigation in which
issues of standing may need to be addressed.
Nevertheless, I have some misgivings about the important
details for altering the law: not about the general thrust but about
important details. I think the problem occurs because Professor
Cromwell insists that standing be isolated and be given functions
that are essentially negative: that is, to guard against a multiplicity
of actions, to eliminate busybodies and to ensure that only justiciable
questions are presented to courts. And all these negative functions
are to be directed against non-traditional legal interests, since he
assumes that where, to this point, standing has been granted, it
ought to continue.1
2
I would start from a different perspective. Traditional legal
interests should not have trump so that no interest should be
excluded from consideration just because it cannot be characterized
as pecuniary or proprietary, or because it is widely held. What I
would have a court do, when it considers recognizing any interest,
is take into account and evaluate reasons why an interest should or
should not be recognized.
Specifically, Professor Cromwell and I differ in the following
respects. He wants to keep the recognition of rights and standing
as separate enterprises (even while remarking that "the process of
how the courts 'recognize' common law and equitable rights is
beyond the scope of this work"1 3), while I think that how courts
recognize rights, and any evaluation of that process, is at the very
heart of the problem we have called standing.
Unlike Professor Cromwell, I see no need to differentiate so
clearly between cause of action and standing. In a strong discussion
he shows how most questions of standing and cause of action could
be viewed as interchangeable; he indicates, for example, how the
classic Donoghue v. Stevenson could be seen as an issue of standing.
He insists, however, that we should not do this because "if the
definition of standing includes such issues, it fails to isolate a set of
12 Ibid at 217.
13 Ibid at 149.
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legal issues concerned solely with access to adjudication that may be
usefully analyzed as a unit.'"14 But of course that is precisely the
point: If we acknowledge that there is no reliable point of divide
between "public" and "private," and that interests of varying
characteristics can deserve the law's protection, then standing, as a
sealed unit, does and should break down, because there is no
sustainable reason to keep it separate and apart.
At this point a concrete example may prove helpful. Let us
take Finlay, the latest foray of the Supreme Court. Finlay brought
suit for a declaration that unlawful payments were being made to
Manitoba, where he resided, under the Canada Assistance Plan and
an agreement between Canada and Manitoba. He asserted that the
legislation stipulated that any agreement by Canada for contributions
include a term that a receiving province furnish aid to "a person in
need ... in an amount or manner that takes into account his basic
requirements,"15 and he alleged that he was such a person within the
meaning of the statute. The action claimed that Manitoba neglected
to comply with this requirement and, therefore, was ineligible to
receive federal contributions.
The Supreme Court of Canada recognized Finlay's
entitlement to sue. Was this because he had a cause of action or
standing?16  I do not think it matters very much, just as I do not
think it is critical to decide whether private or public rights are being
enforced, further, whether or not the interest of the plaintiff is to
be characterized as special, peculiar, or personal. In fact, it is
critical is to look at all the circumstances relevant to why an
entitlement to sue should (or should not) be recognized. In this
view there were cogent reasons to recognize Finlay's entitlement.
14 Ibid at 208-09.
15 Canada Assistance Plan R.S.C. 1970, c. C-1, s. 6(2)(a).
16 1 note, in passing, that the Supreme Court in a short discussion of Finlay's "cause of
action" as opposed to his "standing" observed, supra, note 1 at 371-72:
The issues of standing and reasonable cause of action are obviously closely related,
and as acknowledged by counsel for the appellants, tend in a case such as this to
merge. Indeed, I question whether there is a true issue of reasonable cause of
action distinguishable, as an alternative issue, from that of standing .... Clearly, if
a plaintiff has the requisite standing an action will lie for a declaration that an
administrative authority has acted without statutory authority.
1989]
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His case involved an important and legitimate question, capable of
and appropriate for resolution by a court, it was brought by someone
connected to the issues raised, and there were no substantial reasons
to preclude the litigation.
I also understand Professor Cromwell's attempt to devise a
"check list" for determining standing, in order to somehow tame the
issues.17  But in giving the elements he lists, I would find it
impossible to stay clear of analyzing the substantive law. For
example, under a heading concerning the danger of a multiplicity of
similar actions he raises the following specific question, "Given the
level of demand for judicial resources, is the issue of sufficient
practical importance to deserve a share of those resources?"18 Most
of the time I think that question will be hard to answer, if it is
agreed that to answer it one would have to evaluate the potential
candidate for recognition against some very controversial entitlements
which presently exist. For instance, some would argue that almost
any use of a judge's time is better than having him or her find
"fault" and assess compensation for damages caused by the mayhem
on the highways. From such a viewpoint, an attempt to answer the
question has to involve a discussion of what, I take it, Professor
Cromwell would see as a separate inquiry about substantive law.
Similarly, regarding whether an issue is "institutionally suited
to judicial determination,"19 another item of his checklist, I think the
question must involve a thoroughgoing analysis of all aspects of the
issue and how the court envisions the judicial role. And, if the issue
is truly unsuited for curial resolution, whether one speaks in terms
of no cause of action or no standing should be quite beside the
point.
Cromwell's checklist approach, even with his
acknowledgement of oversimplification, is a false start. Recognition
of any interest and the accompanying entitlement to sue is too
complex a process for such treatment and there are no elements that
arrange themselves peculiarly under the rubric of standing. What
is required is a fundamental turning away from the notion that
17 Supra, note 5 at 216 ('At the risk of oversimplification...').
18 Ibid at 217; and see preceding discussion leading up to the list.
19 Ibid.
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pecuniary or proprietary interests are to be favoured and all others
are suspect. Any time that any interest is recognized, a court is
expressing its views about what values are worth fostering. That
some of these values are not accompanied by traditional legal
interests is not a good enough reason to dismiss them or to believe
they are so suspicious that they must be subject to a particular and
heightened scrutiny apart from the means by which we otherwise
debate the judicial function.
III.
I would like to discuss some aspects of costs which Cromwell
refers to in a conventional way. Largely dismissive of allegations
that liberalized standing will lead to a flood of claims or multiplicity
of proceedings, he bolsters this conclusion by referring to the power
of courts to award costs.20  But to favour liberalized standing
(however articulated) yet rest content with the established costs rules
is, I believe, a curious position.
As an abstraction the traditional rules seem an adequate
compromise. If I win, I recover a significant portion of my costs.
If I lose I must pay such costs. Thus meritorious claims and
defences are encouraged; wobbly ones are chilled. The problem, as
is well known, is that, in actuality, the rules have a disproportionate
impact depending on the characteristics of litigants.21 For those who
do not have a strong economic incentive, those who have little or no
capacity to absorb or pass on attendant costs, or those who litigate
as a rare or even unique event with attendant lack of knowledge and
sophistication, the conventional costs rules are daunting.
The dilemma posed by the costs rules is particularly acute for
those interests barred by conventional standing rules. Not possessing
a claim based pecuniary or proprietary infringement, such interests
will also have no economic incentives to override the disincentives
of the costs rules; given the vagaries of standing law and the present
20 Ibid, at 168.
21 The literature on costs rules and their actual impact on litigation rates is well
developed. See G. Watson et aL, Canadian Civil Procedure (Toronto: Emond-Montgomery,
1988) at c. 3 "Economics of Litigation"
1989] 205
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costs rules, it is a wonder that there are any such claims at all. But
alteration of the costs regime should not be hinged on dividing the
world into those who can characterize their interest in conventional
terms and those who cannot; for even a sizeable economic interest
often will not provide incentive sufficient to outweigh the overall
costs of litigating. If we are to eliminate disincentives which chill
certain litigants, alteration of the costs rules should extend across a
wide range of interests.
I will not attempt in this space to articulate how to go about
this. A number of tools exist. Public funding to underwrite certain
kinds of litigants and types of claims is obviously one. Relieving a
losing party of the obligation to pay costs is another. Permitting
lawyers for the litigants to bear the economic risks attendant upon
litigation is another. Whatever the mix, there should be an
acknowledgment that litigants are not fungible. Claims raising issues
that transcend the immediate personal interests of the parties may
have a stronger claim to be encouraged through facilitative costs
rules. A plaintiff tackling a powerful entity - corporations,
government, trade unions - sophisticated from repeated use of the
system and an ability to finance litigation, does not come to the
process as an equal or even near-equal. These premises may be the
basis for judicial or legislative revamping; to fail to understand
them, however, will leave any claims about equal access to justice
through courts at a formalistic level.
IV.
What good will come of courts' broadening standing to
encompass a diverse range of interests? A vital result will be an
acknowledgment by courts that their function is directed to ends
more diverse than economic quests and personal liberty. Values
such as good health, a safe environment, a sense of individuality in
all its aspects and of position in social organization may be tentative
and abstract, but they are values that can be realized and nurtured
[VOL. 27 NO. I
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by courts.2 2  To broaden standing is to depart from a regime
absorbed with the protection of individual proprietary, economic and
pecuniary values and to recognize other values, many of which may
be more collective than individualistic, and more inspired by altruism
than self-interest. 23
In none of this do I cast judges in the role of omnipotent
seer. This country has a rich ideological tradition, and altruism and
collectivism have been values often nurtured by legislatures and their
agencies. Enlarged standing and revamped costs rules should not
be part and parcel of extravagant claims for the judicial role. But
that role, whatever the limits and definition ought to be, cannot be
realized by pretending that only a certain strain of aspirations should
count, that only a particular view of societal organization ought to
be embodied in how the judiciary discharges its function. For the
courts to continue to adhere to the conventional strictures on
standing would not inhibit any over-reaching; but it would confine
the courts to dealing with a limited range and kind of interests while
the rest of Canadian society expresses itself in a complicated and
variegated array.24 I am thinking here particularly of the resilient
communitarian and collectivist traditions in this country, fed by such
disparate ideologies as toryism - with its emphasis on order and
hierarchy, but also upon restraining individualism for the public good
22 G.B. Baker, "Legal Identity, From Maine and Durkheim to Graveson, Tribe and
Vining: An Essay on Legal Identity, The Coming of Age of Public Law, by Joseph Vining"
(1981) 19 U.W.O. L. Rev. 307 at 310.
23 D. Kennedy, "Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication" (1976) 89 Harv. L.
Rev. 1685; M.V. Tushnet, '"he Sociology of Article III: A Response to Professor Brilmayer"
(1980) 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1698 at 1724: "Broad areas of contemporary law ... are inexplicable
in terms of the ideology of self-determination; clearly they are motivated by an altruistic
ideology."
24 W. Christian & C. Campbell, Political Parties and Ideologies in Canada, 2d ed.
(Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1983) at 3: "... Canada was in its origins and is still a
country of rich ideological diversity; and that the explicit expression and acknowledgement of
these differences gives our country a much greater chance to resolve the question of the kind
of social life we wish to share as fellow citizens."
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- and socialism - as attenuated as it has sometimes become, in
Canada.25
Now, I realize that what I have said so far reveals no theory,
no blueprint for how any interest might be recognized. In the end
are we left with nothing but a hunch about how this new terrain is
to be charted? In responding I begin by saying that no one, so far
as I am aware, who has tackled standing and who urges its expansion
has provided an elaborated theory of how interests should be
recognized. In my view, this would include Professor Cromwell who
provides (in his own characterization) an oversimplified checklist
and leaves the matter at that. I point this out not as a matter of
avoidance (if no one else has done it, I shouldn't have to) but to
suggest that the absence of a grand theory is for a good reason, one
that concerns the connection between traditional and non-traditional
legal interests.
If we were to ask "what is the theory that tells us how to
recognize traditional legal interests?" I doubt that we should receive
a simple or straightforward answer. We might be asked what area
we were interested in: torts, contracts, and so on. We might be
asked to say what school we wished an answer from: law and
economics, critical legal studies, positivism, etc. Similarly, I suggest
that an answer to the question "how do we go about recognizing
these new interests?" will emerge only after a number of such
interests have sought recognition in various areas of law and a
number of schools and positions have brought their analyses to bear.
I expect no clear and simple response and, in this way, the issues
surrounding these interests will be no different from so many others
that law deals with. But all areas and all schools would share
common ground by calling for careful attention to the reasons and
circumstances for and against the recognition of any particular claim.
25 "Canadian Conservatism" ibid at c. 4; "Canadian Socialism" ibid at c. 5; G. Horowitz,
Canadian Labour in Politics (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968), and see especially
c. 1 "Conservatism, Liberalism and Socialism in Canada: An Interpretation."
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V.
Although I disagree with parts of Locus Standi, I think it is
a valuable book. The careful reader cannot come away from it
without asking why standing has become such an important question
in the recent past and what the appropriate response ought to be.
We need to think much longer and harder about the role of
litigation and courts in shaping the social and political life of this
country. Standing is an important focus for that exercise, and
Professor Cromwell and his book do us good service.

